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In 2003 the European Union passed a Directive on the Trade of CO2-allowances within the 
European Union aiming at a substantial contribution of the European Union to the objectives 
of the Kyoto-protocol. One allowance gives the owner the right to emit one ton(t) of CO2. 
Industries included in this system are those which use much energy in their production pro-
cess and emit substantial amounts of CO2, in particular electricity producers, steel, ceramics, 
glass and paper manufacturers. The states of the European Union allocate the allowances to 
their national industries based primarily on a grandfathering system. This means that the com-
panies report their annual CO2-emissions over the last years and get about the same quantities 
as annual emission allowances for free. These quantities have been slightly reduced for 
Germany and the UK relative to the observed emissions in 2000/2 so as to cut back the CO2-
emissions as agreed upon in the Kyoto-protocol. 
The trade of CO2-allowances started over the counter last year (a price index is available from 
October 2004 on). On March 9, 2005 the European  Energy Exchange started its auction 
trade. In October 2004  the price was around 8.70 €/t, in January 2005 it came down to 6.65 
€/t, then it reached its peak of 29.30 €/t in July and at the end of August it traded at about 23 
€/t. So far we observe an enormous price volatility. This raises the question (1) as to what 
determines these price movements, (2) who benefits/suffers from these movements and (3) 
does the high volatility make emissions-trade rather ineffective for long-term investments in 
emissions-saving production technologies. 
Before  addressing these questions, let me  make some general comments on the usefulness of 
an emission allowance-trading system. Since the production technologies for electricity, steel 
etc. differ strongly in their CO2-emissions, it is  difficult to reduce the aggregate level of 
emissions by governmental directives. A more effective coordination instrument is a price 
mechanism which imposes the same cost per CO2-ton on all CO2-emitters. This can be 
achieved by assigning all emitters CO2-allowances which they can trade in a market at a price 
equating supply and demand. Then every emitter asks himself which production technology 
he should use in order to minimize his overall production cost. In an ideal system, all emitters 
operate under the same conditions so that the most CO2-intensive production technologies are 
used least and will be replaced by investing in less CO2-intensive technologies. 
Even though the EU-Directive on trade of CO2-allowances seems to be a promising step, 
much needs to be done to approach the ideal system. First, national governments in the EU 
allocate the CO2-allowances in different ways, being more or less generous. Second, an 
intensive lobbying of national industries tries to redistribute allowances between industries 
and to set the path for the allocation of CO2-allowances in future periods. Third, outside the 
EU there is no such system so that CO2-intensive industries outside the EU have no incentive 
to economize on their CO2-emissions. Similarly, electricity-intensive industries outside the 
EU get electricity cheaper than within the EU  and, thus, have a competitive advantage. The 
EU-Directive at least takes a first step to mitigate these problems. A company located in the 
EU may obtain additional allowances from Joint Implementation Projects  reducing CO2-
emissions in other countries which have signed the Kyoto-protocol, and from Clean 
Development Projects reducing CO2-emissions in third countries. Thus, if a German company 
cooperates with a Russian CO2-intensive power plant to reduce its emissions, the German 
company can obtain additional allowances.                                                                                                          
                                                 
1 I am grateful to the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung for some data, Jürgen Rothmund for his 
computational assistance,  Thilo Franke for legal information and Wolfgang Bühler for comments. Movements of the CO2-price are driven by supply and demand. In order to better understand 
these, first ask the question who benefits and who loses from price increases. The CO2-emit-
ters/polluters are given CO2-allowances for free so as to enable them to continue their pro-
duction without additional cost. This does not imply, however, that they sell their products in 
the presence of  emission-trading at the old prices. Let us look, for example, at the  wholesale 
electricity price. In Europe, electricity is generated by different technologies which are given 
below with their respective average CO2-emission in tons per MWh. 
 
Energy source   Percent of  power 
generation 
CO2-emission 
Water, wind, sun, biogas  14  -- 
Nuclear energy  32  -- 
Natural gas  18  0.5 
Hard coal  19  0.9 
Brown coal  11  1.0 
Oil    6  0.9 
 
Taking a weighted average this implies an emission of 0.425 t/MWh . Given a time-series of 
daily CO2-allowances from November 01, 2004 until August 30, 2005 we derive the daily 
price changes. Similarly, we take the first differences of the daily wholesale prices for 
electricity from the European Energy Exchange for the same time period. Since the daily spot 
prices vary strongly because of immediate weather changes and other short-term factors, we 
take the baseload future contract 4/05 which matures in the last quarter of 2005. A regression 
of the electricity price changes on the CO2-price changes shows a regression coefficient of 0.4 
with a t-value of 7.7 and an R
2 of 0.23. Hence the regression coefficient is very close to the 
average emission of .425. This clearly demonstrates that the electricity price is raised by the 
average cost of CO2-emissions (see graph). Taking a CO2-price of 20 €/t means that the price 
of a MWh goes up by about 8 € due to emission trade. This corresponds to a wholesale price 
increase of 25 to 30 % for a MWh. Interestingly, including the daily spot price changes for the 
main CO2-burdened energy sources natural gas, coal and crude oil in the regression basically 
has no effect. All the regression coefficients are not significantly different from zero, the 
adjusted R
2 goes down. (Using future instead of spot price changes might have stronger 
effects.) This underlines the importance of the allowance price for the electricity price. 
Hence the electricity producers who get the allowances for free, strongly benefit from the 
trade system even if they use them and do not sell any. Since they sell electricity at a price 
including the emission costs, they cash in the value of the allowances. Is that substantial? 
Given that the German government allocated 500 mio allowances for each year 2005/6/7 to 
the German industry, this represents an annual value of roughly 500 x 23 = 11.5 bio €. The 
beneficiaries are mainly the companies´ owners. Therefore many people would prefer an 
auction of allowances by governments instead of an allocation for free. Who pays? All those 
who buy the products from the companies endowed with the allowances. Consumers, for 
example, pay these costs through higher electricity prices. This would be alright if the price 
increase would equal the marginal pollution damage created by the electricity production. 
This helps to answer the question what drives the movements of the allowance price. Given 
the recent sharp increase in the allowance price up to more than 29 €/t, some people speculate 
that the electricity producers might have manipulated the allowance market so as to move up 
the allowance price which then triggers an electricity price increase. Even though in Germany 
there are only four substantial electricity producers who might tacitly collude to drive up the 
allowance price, on a European scale there are many more producers. If many producers act 
as price takers, it should not be easy to move prices up artificially. Also hedge funds might try 
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market. But it is questionable whether the companies endowed with allowances, act com-
petitively. Since all of them benefit from a price increase, they might collude to manipulate 
the market. Does collusion explain that a change of the allowance price of 1 € on average 
leads to a price change on the next day of about .3 € of the same sign? This issue should be 
investigated thoroughly. 
Of course, many other forces also affect the CO2-price. First, there is strong uncertainty about 
the prospective demand for allowances from the various industries in the EU-countries over 
the period 2005/7. For example, the demand for electricity which is estimated to increase 
annually by 3 %, may grow faster or slower and the technological progress in developing less 
CO2-intensive production technologies is hard to predict. Second, there is much political 
uncertainty. This refers to the distribution of allowances and also to the political attitude 
towards the use of nuclear energy. Third, changes in the prices of yellow cake (nuclear 
energy), natural gas, coal and crude oil may affect the CO2-price. But a regression of the 
allowance price changes on the spot price changes of the main CO2-burdened energy sources 
natural gas, coal and crude oil shows no significant results. So, at least for the short 
observation period of this study, allowance prices cannot be explained by the prices of these 
energy sources. The high volatility of the allowance price may also be in the interest of 
companies having real options whose value increases with the allowance price volatility. 
 This leads to the final question: Can the allowance price act as reliable price signal for 
companies to invest in less CO2-intensive production technologies? The answer is manifold. 
Regarding a move to technologies without CO2-emissions, the price mechanism itself may be 
rather ineffective. The reason is that a company using these desirable technologies, may not 
be awarded allowances in the future so that it cannot sell these. Thus, the net benefit from 
switching to a technology without CO2-emissions is questionable. If, however, electricity 
consumption increases year by year, but aggregate allowances are reduced over time, then 
companies may be forced to reduce the use of CO2-intensive technologies. This would 
reinforce the discussion about the use of nuclear energy. An alternative would be to produce 
more electricity using natural gas because it generates only half of the CO2-emissions 
compared to coal. If many producers would do this, it is likely to drive up the price of gas 
relative to other energy sources rendering the technology substitution perhaps unattractive, 
apart from political issues like dependence on foreign gas supply. Regarding the impact of the 
allowance price on the investment decisions, it is plausible that even a highly uncertain price 
would give an incentive to use a less CO2-intensive technology based on the same energy 
source. But it is questionable whether a highly uncertain price would  have a strong impact on 
substituting one technology for a technology using a different energy source. 
 